Fiscal Rules and Investment in the Upcoming Budget

Economic

Summary:

The government is reportedly considering a change to the debt rule to allow for more borrowing for investment. We consider some of the options.

In her recent speech at the 2024 Labour Party conference, the new Chancellor Rachel Reeves promised that the fiscal event on 30 October will be a ‘Budget for investment’. She said that ‘growth is the challenge and investment is the solution’ and declared that ‘it is time that the Treasury moved on from just counting the costs of investments, to recognising the benefits too’. This has fuelled widespread speculation about how a substantial top-up to investment plans might be reconciled with the new government’s manifesto promise that ‘debt must be falling as a share of the economy by the fifth year of the forecast’.

One suggestion is that the government might adopt a looser debt target than the one adopted by the previous government, to allow for more borrowing for investment while staying within the letter of the fiscal rules.

In all of this, it is important to stress the distinction between the case for more investment and the case for more borrowing for investment. The government could, if it wished, offset any increase in investment through higher taxes, or through lower spending elsewhere (e.g. on public services or social security), and avoid the need for additional borrowing. That is, as Ms Reeves put it herself in her Mais Lecture, the government could ‘prioritise investment within a framework that would get debt falling as a share of GDP over the medium term’. It is perfectly coherent to think that the UK government should invest more, but that this should not be paid for through higher levels of borrowing.

Here, we put that debate to one side, and proceed on the assumption that the government does, for better or worse, wish to relax the fiscal rules to allow for more borrowing for investment. We consider some of the options available to the government, and the key issues and questions at hand in each case.

The key point is that there are advantages and disadvantages of each possible change (some, such as a target for public sector net worth, come with particularly large disadvantages) and no unambiguously ‘right’ answers. It is nonetheless hard to escape the suspicion that the government is attracted not by any theoretical advantages of a change in the debt rule, but by the fact that it would allow for significantly more borrowing for investment without any need for tough choices elsewhere. Rather than hide behind a technical change, if the government believes there is a principled case for more borrowing for investment, it should make it. This could be accompanied by a change in the debt rule to provide new, higher limits on borrowing and an indication of the government’s logic. Yet a large fiscal expansion would not be without risks, and impacts of debt and debt servicing costs cannot be disregarded entirely. Ensuring that the investment funded by that borrowing is – and is widely seen to be – spent well will be crucial.

What might it mean to recognise the benefits of investment?

It was not entirely clear what Ms Reeves meant when she said that ‘it is time that the Treasury moved on from just counting the costs of investments, to recognising the benefits too’.

One option would be to place a greater focus on the potential benefits of public investment in terms of the impact on the economy’s productive potential. A recent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) paper set out in detail how the OBR plans to model the supply-side benefits of public investment going forward. Two key points are worth drawing out. First, the OBR’s estimated effects are not huge, and not large enough for investments to be self-financing for many years. Second, many of the supply-side benefits are expected to materialise only in the longer term, beyond the government’s current five-year forecast horizon. A permanent, sustained 1% of GDP increase in government investment is estimated to increase potential output by 0.4% after five years and by 2.4% after fifty years. The return to the exchequer would be smaller, given that the government would recoup less than half of this in additional tax revenues. In light of this, HM Treasury may wish to publish its own analysis on the potential benefits of investment projects, particularly where it considers that the returns are likely to be greater than those set out by the OBR for ‘average’ public investment, or where it is willing to take more of a ‘punt’ on certain kinds of investment.

In addition, the government may wish to consider a forecast horizon of longer than five years when thinking about the profile of debt, in order to allow for more of the benefits to materialise. One risk here is that a promise to have debt falling in (say) ten years’ time is even more susceptible to gaming (e.g. promises to raise taxes or cut spending only after the next election) than a promise to have debt falling in five years’ time. A longer forecast horizon might also make longer-term demographic- and climate-related fiscal pressures more explicit, and harder to ignore, meaning that a longer-term fiscal target is not automatically easier to meet.

Another option would be to consider alternative measures of the government balance sheet that attempt to capture more of the government’s assets as well as its liabilities. This would reflect the ‘benefits’ of investment in that it would capture the assets created through that investment as well as the liabilities (debt) taken on to fund it. The next section considers some of these alternative measures.

Different debt and balance sheet measures

The previous government’s debt target required that public sector net debt excluding the Bank of England (PSND ex BoE) be falling as a share of national income between years 4 and 5 of the forecast. This measure of debt, sometimes called ‘underlying debt’, strips out the contributions of the Bank of England’s balance sheet – most notably the loans made by the Bank to large companies under the Term Funding Scheme.

The Labour manifesto declared that ‘debt must be falling as a share of the economy by the fifth year of the forecast’, but did not specify which measure of debt. The new government may wish to choose a measure other than PSND ex BoE. Previous governments have targeted ‘headline’ public sector net debt (PSND; see this previous IFS Green Budget piece for a detailed explanation of the difference between PSND and PSND ex BoE). Alternatively, the government could decide to strip out further components from the measure of debt used in its fiscal rule. Examples of debt the government may want to exclude from consideration include any debt taken on by publicly owned or underwritten banks such as the new ‘National Wealth Fund’, or any valuation losses associated with the Bank of England’s quantitative easing programme.

Or, if the government is keen to recognise better the benefits of investment as well as the costs, it could target a broader measure of the government balance sheet. One option would be to target public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL). Another would be to target public sector net worth (PSNW).

The differences between PSND, PSNFL and PSNW are summarised in Figure 1. PSND nets off the value of liquid financial assets (those that can readily be converted into cash, such as foreign exchange reserves) from the value of the national debt (defined as the public sector’s loan liabilities, debt securities, currency and deposit holdings). PSNFL provides a slightly broader picture, by also including illiquid financial assets (such as the student loan book, and the assets held by funded public sector pension schemes, which are less easy to convert into cash) and a broader range of financial liabilities (such as the liabilities associated with funded pension schemes). PSNW provides a broader picture still, by also including the estimated value of non-financial assets (such as buildings, roads and other transport infrastructure). Some measures of PSNW also include the liabilities associated with unfunded public sector pension schemes – which in the UK is most public sector pension schemes – but these are not shown here for simplicity. Figure 2 shows the evolution of these measures since 1997–98, including the March 2024 forecast.

Fiscal Rules and Investment in the Upcoming Budget_1

Fiscal Rules and Investment in the Upcoming Budget_2

There is a debate to be had about the merits of targeting each of these measures (we consider some of the most important ones below). Notably, a commitment to have regard for all of them is already legislated – although it tends to garner far less attention than the main fiscal rules. But the government will presumably also have (at least) one eye on the impact adopting each of these measures for the main fiscal rule might have on the government’s ability to borrow to invest. To that end, Table 1 shows how the government would have been performing against a range of fiscal rules in March 2024 (had it replaced PSND ex BoE with an alternative measure without making any other changes to the structure of the rule). A switch to headline PSND would have added around £16 billion of so-called ‘headroom’ in March 2024; a switch to PSNFL would have added £53 billion; and a switch to PSNW would have added £58 billion.

Fiscal Rules and Investment in the Upcoming Budget_3

There are three things to note. First, any increase in ‘headroom’ against these targets would not allow for a large increase in borrowing to fund tax cuts or day-to-day spending, because the government would still be bound by its promise to bring the current budget into balance (a target against which the government would have had just £14 billion of ‘headroom’ in March 2024). Second, just as a target that requires PSND ex BoE to be falling between year 4 and year 5 of the forecast suffers from major design flaws (flaws which have been extensively discussed elsewhere), so too would a target for PSNFL or PSNW to be falling between year 4 and year 5. Third, just because a change to targeting PSNFL or PSNW might add as much as £50 billion to the government’s measured ‘headroom’, this does not mean that the government should increase borrowing by anything like that amount. Indeed, always aiming to have a stock measure (such as debt) falling by the finest possible margin (to ‘max out’ any ‘headroom’) breeds an environment where policy flip-flops in response to highly uncertain changes in the forecast.

Relatedly, there is no reason to think that the relative magnitude of the fall in these different measures of debt would look similar in future forecasts. Just because it is easier to meet a PSNFL target today does not mean that will always be the case. There is a danger in choosing a fiscal target opportunistically, because it gives the desired answer on ‘headroom’ at a particular moment in time. There are costs to frequently changing the fiscal rules, and the new government should use this opportunity to choose a fiscal target it is willing and able to stick to in the longer term.

Target a slightly different measure of debt?

The merits of a switch to targeting headline PSND were discussed in a previous IFS Green Budget piece. The crux is that the key reason for such a switch (beyond the simple one that it might allow the government to borrow a bit more) would be to reduce the impact of Bank of England operations on performance against the fiscal rule for the next few years. The Bank of England is making losses on its quantitative easing programme, and is therefore making claims on the indemnity provided by the Treasury which underwrites those losses. The recognition of these losses is expected to push up PSND ex BoE over the coming years (including in year 5 of the forecast, the only one relevant for the fiscal rule) but to have a much smaller impact on headline PSND in those years (because a bigger chunk of these losses have already been recognised in PSND in the past – see here for more detail on the specifics).

The principled argument for a switch to PSND (or stripping out the impact of Bank of England operations in some other way) rests on the argument that the interaction between these losses and the current debt rule is leading to overly tight fiscal policy. This is where the poor design of the existing debt rule is important. It targets only the change in debt between two years (years 4 and 5 of the rolling forecast period). Losses from the indemnity are lumpy, and if losses are particularly concentrated in the fifth year of the forecast (due to the timing of Bank of England asset sales under quantitative tightening – or more precisely, and even more ridiculously, what the OBR judges the timing of the Bank of England’s asset sales under quantitative tightening might be), then this would lead to a temporary overstatement of the need for a fiscal tightening. In that case, targeting PSND (or stripping out Bank operations in some other way) might be judged an improvement.

As well as the Bank of England, the government could choose to exclude other parts of the public sector from its fiscal rule. In particular, publicly owned or underwritten banks (including the new National Wealth Fund) are included in the public sector for accounting and statistical purposes, and so their debt counts towards the total. The idea behind the National Wealth Fund is that, with its initial capital injection of £7.3 billion, it will seek to take on more debt (leverage its balance sheet) and undertake speculative investments on government priorities such as the net zero transition – much like any other bank, though with different objectives. But if these public investment banks are constrained by the government’s overall debt target, they may be limited in their ability to take on more debt. Of course, we would not want these banks to become over-leveraged, or to take on too many risks. The question here is whether they are better constrained through other means (such as banking regulation). Other countries – such as Germany – exclude debt taken on by publicly owned or underwritten development banks from their fiscal targets; see here for the argument that the UK should do the same.

Target public sector net worth (PSNW)?

Changing the measure of debt used in the fiscal target might allow the government to do more borrowing for investment, but would not in itself change the degree to which the benefits of that investment are recognised.

One option, therefore, would be to target PSNW rather than PSND. The arguments for and against doing so were discussed in detail in the 2023 IFS Green Budget. The key attraction of a PSNW target is that, by capturing a more comprehensive range of liabilities and assets, it can provide a more complete picture of the impacts of government action (or inaction). So, if the government were to borrow to invest in transport infrastructure, the additional debt taken on would show up in the government’s liabilities, but the value of the assets created (e.g. new roads or railway tunnels) would also be reflected as a non-financial asset within PSNW. It could also give the government greater incentives to invest in higher-quality projects and to better manage and maintain its assets.

There are, however, considerable downsides to a formal, numerical target for PSNW. Interested readers should consult last year’s IFS Green Budget, but the key issue is that changes in PSNW might tell us little about the government’s ability to access capital markets or service its debt. Non-financial public sector assets – such as the UK road network, school buildings, prisons, and army barracks – are either extremely difficult to sell, extremely difficult to value, or both. The problem with them being difficult to sell is that they are little use in a fiscal crisis if they cannot be sold off to meet financing needs. The problem with them being difficult to value is that a Chancellor might be more tempted to cut taxes or increase spending in the face of a favourable revaluation (say, if a change in statistical methodology led to the conclusion that the best estimate of the monetary value of the road network is higher than previously thought) than he or she might be tempted to carry out a fiscal tightening in the light of an unfavourable one.

One option to lessen some of these concerns (previously proposed by researchers at the Institute for Government) would be to introduce a target defined in terms of the impact of policy on PSNW, rather than the level of PSNW itself. That would limit the degree to which changes in PSNW unrelated to policy (such as methodological changes in how the road network is valued) induce a fiscal policy response. The problem is, the recorded value of many assets created by government investment (the ‘replacement cost’) bears little relevance to the economic or social value of the asset, or to assessments of fiscal sustainability. In other words, in practice, the measured impact of policy on PSNW might bear little relation to its ‘benefits’.

These are very good reasons why more traditional measures of debt, debt interest and borrowing will remain important for fiscal policy, and ought to be considered alongside any target for PSNW.

Target public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL)?

Another option would be to target PSNFL, a less comprehensive measure of the balance sheet than PSNW (see Figure 1). The key difference between a target for debt (PSND) and a target for PSNFL is that PSNFL also includes illiquid financial assets (such as the student loan book) and a broader range of financial liabilities (such as the liabilities associated with funded pension schemes – but not the much larger liabilities from pay-as-you-go pension schemes or the state pension). Notably, it does not include the kinds of assets that an increase in investment spending is likely to buy – such as energy pylons or hospitals.

Instead, the main theoretical attraction of a PSNFL target is that in capturing a broader range of government assets and liabilities, it provides a more complete picture of the government’s financial position, while removing some of the perverse incentives associated with a narrow focus on PSND (such as the incentive to sell off long-term financial assets for less than their market value, since PSND is reduced by the money raised through the sale but is unaffected by the loss of the asset). In other words, a fiscal rule targeting PSNFL would encourage the government to have greater regard for its financial assets as well as its liabilities.

Table 1 shows that in March 2024, a target for PSNFL to be falling in year 5 would have provided the government with more than £50 billion of additional ‘headroom’ relative to the previous government’s target for PSND ex BoE. The difference is largely driven by the differential treatment of student loans. Where student loans are not expected to be repaid, this now (sensibly) scores immediately against public sector net borrowing. But PSND still increases by the full amount loaned out – i.e. even including the amount that is expected to be repaid subsequently. The difference is that the portion of student loans that are expected to be repaid in future are added to the illiquid financial assets captured by PSNFL. So, the same liability appears in both, but in PSNFL this is partially offset by an asset. So when the size of the student loan book increases (e.g. due to growing student numbers or an increase in the amount that students can borrow), PSND will increase by more than PSNFL (or, equivalently, PSND will fall by less than PSNFL).

There are, inevitably, some notable downsides to a PSNFL target. One issue is that, as with PSNW, performance against a PSNFL target would not necessarily be informative about the government’s ability to access capital markets or service its debts. The financial assets included in PSNFL but not PSND are illiquid (like student loans, assets held by the local government pension scheme, or mortgage books acquired during the financial crisis). In a financing crisis, where the government is seeking to sell off assets, these are likely to be less useful than liquid assets such as foreign currency holdings, but more useful than non-financial assets (such as the prisons estate or aircraft carriers, which cannot realistically be sold). For that reason, the concerns raised above about PSNW are less acute for PSNFL, but remain concerns all the same. A situation where PSND were on a permanently rising path, even if counterbalanced by the accumulation of financial assets in the public sector (so, if PSNFL were stable or falling), may still be risky.

Another issue is that departments may also face new incentives to design policies that create financial assets (e.g. student loans rather than a graduate tax to finance higher education) purely because of differences in how the accounting treatment affects ease of compliance with a PSNFL target. There are also methodological challenges to estimating PSNFL (see OBR discussion of these challenges here and here). Revisions to PSNFL estimates for past years can be large – for example, in September 2023, estimated PSNFL in 2021–22 and 2022–23 fell by £38 billion and £26 billion, respectively, due to methodological improvements and the incorporation of data on public sector funded pensions that become available with a lag. Forecasts for the future may be even more volatile. This means that measured ‘headroom’ against a PSNFL target – especially one for PSNFL to be falling (since it then matters where you start from) – could be even more prone to wild revisions without a material change in the fiscal situation.

Conclusion

This is far from an exhaustive discussion. No single measure is a perfect indicator of the health of the public finances, and there is no unambiguously ‘right’ answer. There are principled arguments for and against each of these changes. If the Chancellor really wants her fiscal target to reflect the benefits of investment, that might suggest a target for PSNW. But a formal target for PSNW would come with considerable problems, and we would strongly advise against. Switching to a target for PSNFL would come with fewer problems, and would allow much more space for borrowing for investment (perhaps as much as £50 billion more), but would not meaningfully reflect the benefits of that investment. Readers can make their own minds up as to whether a shift to a measure such as PSNFL would represent a breach of a manifesto promise (though the authors begrudgingly and regretfully acknowledge that this is not a mainstream political issue). Either way, even if a shift to PSNFL allowed for more investment within the fiscal rules, it would not do much to capture the benefits of that investment.

It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the government is attracted not by any theoretical advantages of a change in the debt rule, but by the fact that it would allow for significantly more borrowing for investment. Here, it is worth pausing to comment on scale. On existing plans, public sector net investment is currently forecast to be £53 billion in 2028–29. Net gilt issuance in 2028–29 is forecast to be £87 billion. Against that, any change that allowed for an extra £50 billion of borrowing for investment would be an enormous shift, even if not all of this extra space were used at once. If even half that figure were spent on additional investment, debt (on the previous target’s measure) could be more than 3% of national income higher by the end of the parliament and would almost certainly still be rising at the end of the forecast period, even accounting for typical feedback effects via a larger economy.

Such a large change would also raise questions about the government’s capacity to spend this money well, and about the possible impact on government borrowing costs and interest rates more generally. Previous Treasury modelling suggested that an increase in borrowing of 1% of GDP might increase interest rates by between 50 and 125 basis points, depending on economic conditions. An extra £50 billion of borrowing in 2028–29 (roughly the amount of extra ‘headroom’ provided by a switch to PSNFL) would amount to around 1.6% of GDP. To the extent that the additional investment produced material benefits for the productive potential of the economy, we would expect the impact on interest rates to be smaller. But the point is, additional borrowing on this scale could have a material impact on interest rates.

Importantly, if the government wants to relax its debt rule to allow for more borrowing for investment, it is not enough to justify this on the grounds that ‘investment is good’. It also needs to explain why we should be borrowing to pay for it. If the government believes more borrowing is the best – or perhaps even the only – way to get to net zero emissions and that failure to do so would be more costly than a rising debt path, it should make the case for this explicitly, rather than hiding behind a ‘technical’ change. If the government is confident that extra borrowing for investment would be sufficiently growth-enhancing to improve long-term fiscal sustainability, it should make that case (to citizens, as well as to gilt market participants). This could be accompanied by a change in the debt rule to signal the logic behind this fiscal strategy, but the crucial thing would be to ensure that the investment funded by that borrowing is – and is widely seen to be – spent well. There are undoubtedly opportunities for productivity-enhancing public investment projects in the UK. Given the UK’s history as a low-investment economy, there may even be some low-hanging fruit. But not all investment is growth-enhancing, and not all of what counts towards measured public investment is in tangible assets (more than 10% of the total is student loans, for example). Making the right choices, and having an institutional framework to make that more likely, is key. And regardless of the precise fiscal rules, debt and debt servicing costs cannot be disregarded entirely.

Finally, the government may rightly be concerned that the current debt rule’s conclusions about fiscal ‘headroom’ can swing wildly from one fiscal event to the next even in the absence of significant revisions to economic and fiscal fundamentals. We very much share this concern. But it should then consider the root of this issue: not the measure of debt chosen, but the narrow targeting of the change in debt relative to the change in nominal national income over a 12-month period several years in the future. Put differently, many of the problems identified with the current fiscal framework are downstream of the original mistake – aiming to have debt forecast to fall over the course of one year in five years’ time, and by an ultra-fine margin relative to the inherent uncertainty.

To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

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FOREX.com

Commodity

Gold closed the week flat after struggling for direction all week. On Friday, a strong US jobs report initially sent the metal lower, before dip buyers stepped in and later took profit ahead of the weekend. The US nonfarm payrolls report has thrown a bit of a curveball at the Federal Reserve after it easily beat expectations with a print of 254,000 jobs compared to the forecasted 140,000. The stronger data puts the Fed in a tough spot, as the narrative of a cooling economy got a lot more complicated. With the labour market still running strong, it’s no wonder Fed Chair Powell has already dismissed the idea of another 50-basis-point rate cut. Now, it’s all but certain: don’t expect any further aggressive rate cuts this year. The dollar surged on the back of this report, and gold, like other metals, saw an early dip. But as the dust settled, gold found its footing again and powered higher, riding the momentum alongside stock indices. Silver also saw a big move, nearly breaking the $33 barrier before easing off with gold by the close of play on Friday. But with geopolitical tensions simmering in the Middle East, the gold outlook is not completely bearish yet even if the metal remains severely overbought and the US dollar has just had one of its strongest weeks in months.

Gold outlook: what’s next for the Fed?

The Fed is now walking a tightrope. Inflation is still a concern, especially with crude oil rebounding sharply amid geopolitical concerns and China’s stimulus. Yet, they must be careful not to pump the brakes too hard on an economy that’s still showing resilience. The odds of a 50-basis-point rate cut are now off the table, and even if October’s jobs report shows some softening, it would take a significant slowdown to justify such an aggressive move.

So, what does this mean for the gold outlook? In the short term, gold’s price movements will likely continue to be reactive to the US dollar and Fed policy expectations. If the Fed stays cautious and maintains a steady course on rates, gold could come under some pressure in the week ahead. But with geopolitical risks adding uncertainty to the broader market, the potential downside could be limited.

Looking ahead: key data to watch

The week ahead brings some key data points that could shift the outlook further. The US CPI report, due Thursday, is expected to show inflation at 2.3% year-over-year, down from 2.5% in August. If inflation comes in softer than expected, it could add some dovish sentiment to the mix, giving gold another boost.

On Friday, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment data will offer insights into how consumers are feeling about the economy. With the Fed’s dual mandate of maximising employment and stabilising prices, sentiment indicators are increasingly important. A drop in consumer confidence could weigh on future economic activity, potentially influencing Fed policy and impacting gold.

Technical gold outlook: a bearish turn ahead?

Source: TradingView.com

Gold has maintained a bullish technical outlook, but its price action this week might signal a shift as prices continue to remain at extreme overbought levels on higher time frames. We could be seeing the beginnings of a bearish reversal pattern on the gold chart, particularly if the dollar continues to strengthen. But before call the top, we need to see some confirmation that the rally has ended. Indeed, there are plenty of technical levels that could offer support on the dips. Among these, $2600 is a key short-term level to monitor closely in the event we break last week’s support around $2635. The 2024 bullish trend line comes ins around $2530, with the psychologically important $2500 level being the next potential support to watch.

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FxPro

Cryptocurrency

Bitcoin remains just above its 50-day moving average at $61,150 and is virtually unchanged for the day. The prolonged consolidation sets up a strong move in the event of a breakout or bounce from a key level. A local victory for the bulls can be declared on a break above $64K and for the bears on a failure below $60K.

Ethereum is trading at $2,380 (-0.3% in 24 hours), near the bottom of its range since early August. The lacklustre performance of the second-largest cryptocurrency is perhaps indicative of the market’s true sentiment, as it is less tied to traditional finance.

News background

Investors remain confident in the long-term prospects of BTC-ETFs despite the correction. Issuers of spot bitcoin-ETFs have redeemed 911,000 BTC – 4.6 per cent of the available supply of digital gold, Glassnode calculated.

Bitcoin’s bullish phase has accelerated and is 100 days ahead of historical data, according to a CoinMarketCap report. Based on this assumption, BTC’s potential peak would come in mid-May or June 2025.

The U.S. SEC has appealed an August court ruling in a lawsuit against Ripple. CEO Brad Garlinghouse confirmed that Ripple has no concerns about the status of XRP and is prepared to continue its legal battle with the regulator.

The SEC announced Gurbir Grewal’s resignation as director of the Division of Enforcement after three years on the job. The crypto community called him the ‘mastermind behind the SEC’s attack’ on cryptocurrencies but questioned the change in policy after his departure.

The bankrupt FTX will sell 22.3 million blocked Worldcoin (WLD) tokens valued at approximately $36.1 million via auction at a significant discount. The discount to the current price of the asset could be 40%-75%.

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SAXO

Economic

Introduction

Intel (NASDAQ: INTC) has been making headlines lately, with reports suggesting a potential $5 billion investment from Apollo Global Management. This news follows previous speculation that Qualcomm might be interested in acquiring the semiconductor giant. While a full acquisition seems unlikely at the moment, such news can cause significant market movements and volatility. For options traders, these conditions present both opportunities and risks.

Even if you decide not to trade Intel at this time, the insights from this article can be applied to other stocks or situations where similar conditions exist, such as high volatility, potential takeover news, or low nominal stock prices. We’ll explore what the options chain indicates and how to approach different trading strategies in various scenarios.

Important note:

The strategies and examples provided in this article are purely for educational purposes. They are intended to assist in shaping your thought process and should not be replicated or implemented without careful consideration. Every investor or trader must conduct their own due diligence and take into account their unique financial situation, risk tolerance, and investment objectives before making any decisions. Remember, investing in the stock market carries risk, and it's crucial to make informed decisions.

What Are Your Options - Intel: to Trade or Not to Trade_1

Trading stocks with potential takeover news: What to watch out for

When a company like Intel is involved in takeover speculation, its stock price can become highly volatile. This uncertainty can lead to rapid price movements, often in both directions, as investors react to news and rumors. For options traders, this environment offers opportunities but also requires caution. Here’s what to consider:

Implied volatility (IV) surge: Takeover news typically drives up implied volatility, increasing options premiums. While selling options in a high-IV environment can be profitable, traders need to be wary of potential price spikes or crashes if news breaks.

Risk of gaps: In case of a sudden announcement, the stock could gap up or down significantly, potentially breaching multiple strike prices. Defined-risk strategies can help mitigate this risk.

Time decay consideration: Since such news is speculative, it’s essential to keep an eye on time decay (Theta). If no concrete developments occur, the stock might revert to its pre-news trading range, making long option positions vulnerable.

Implied volatility and options market opportunities

Intel's implied volatility has spiked following the news, creating an interesting landscape for options traders.

What Are Your Options - Intel: to Trade or Not to Trade_2

Here’s what to consider:

Current IV levels: Implied volatility is currently elevated. This suggests that the market expects significant movement in the near term. High IV can benefit options sellers, who can collect higher premiums. However, caution is needed to avoid potential sharp moves in the stock.

Volatility contraction play: If you believe that the hype around the takeover news will subside without a significant move in the stock, a volatility contraction play, such as selling Iron Condors or Iron Butterflies, could be effective.

What the options chain says: Call/put skew

The option chain data for INTC, focusing on the November 15th expiry (51 days out), reveals contrasting signals between implied volatility (IV) skew and price skew. This expiry was chosen because it is far enough to capture market expectations beyond immediate noise yet close enough to reflect the impact of upcoming events like earnings or corporate announcements. The $16 put and $30 call were selected as they are equidistant from the current stock price of $22.81, providing a balanced perspective on how the market is pricing potential movements in both directions.

The $16 put has a higher implied volatility (65.04%) compared to the $30 call (61.93%), indicating a put skew. This suggests that downside protection is relatively more expensive, reflecting market concerns over potential negative developments or a broader risk-off sentiment. However, when looking at the actual option prices, the $30 call ($0.37) is trading significantly higher than the $16 put ($0.15). This price skew implies that traders are placing a premium on upside potential, likely driven by recent speculation around a Qualcomm takeover or a $5 billion investment from Apollo Global Management.

These contrasting signals between IV and price skews highlight a market that is hedging against downside risk while simultaneously speculating on a significant upward move. This dual sentiment reflects a complex market environment where participants are balancing caution with optimism, positioning themselves for potential volatility amidst a backdrop of strategic developments and market speculation.

Options strategies for different scenarios

Based on your outlook for Intel, various options strategies can be considered. Whether you’re expecting a big move, a moderate change, or stability, there are tailored approaches for each scenario. Before executing any of these strategies, it’s essential to enter them into a strategy builder or trading window, such as those available in the SaxoInvestor, SaxoTrader, or SaxoTrader Pro platforms. This allows you to evaluate the potential risk, reward, and profit/loss scenarios, ensuring the trade aligns with your expectations and risk profile. Here are a few strategy ideas to match different market expectations:

Long straddle or strangle

Strategy: Buy both a $23 call and $23 put (straddle) or a $25 call and $20 put (strangle) with the November 15th expiry.

Pro: Profits from large moves in either direction; ideal for high volatility.

Con: High cost and risk of loss if the stock doesn’t move significantly.

Risk/profit: Max loss is the premium paid; profit potential is unlimited if the stock makes a big move.

Bull call spread & protective put

Strategy: Buy a $23/$28 call spread and a $16 put.

Pro: Balanced risk-reward, profits from moderate upside while limiting downside risk.

Con: Limited profit potential due to the capped call spread; premium costs add up.

Risk/profit: Max loss is the net premium; max profit is the spread width minus net cost. Losses are mitigated by the protective put.

Iron condor

Strategy: Sell the $27/$32 call spread and the $20/$15 put spread with the November 15th expiry.

Pro: Allows you to profit from a stable stock price by collecting premium from both the call and put spreads; profits if the stock stays within the range of $20 to $27.

Con: Risk is defined but should be carefully managed; losses occur if the stock moves outside the expected range.

Risk/profit: Max loss is $5 per spread minus the premium received; max profit is the total net premium received if the stock remains between $20 and $27 until expiry, offering a balanced 3:1 risk/reward ratio.

Ratio call spread

Strategy: Buy one $27 call and sell two $29 calls with the November 15th expiry.

Pro: Generates a small upfront credit ($0.16); profits from moderate upside while lowering initial cost.

Con: Risk of unlimited loss if the stock rallies aggressively above $31.16.

Risk/profit: Max profit of $2.16 at $29; breakeven at $31.16. Unlimited risk beyond $31.16 if the stock rises significantly.

Broken wing butterfly spread

Strategy: Buy one $23 call, sell two $25 calls, and buy one $30 call with the November 15th expiry.

Pro: Generates a small credit while allowing for a defined risk; profits from a moderate move up.

Con: Limited profit range and potential for loss if the stock does not move as expected.

Risk/profit: Max profit at $25 strike; max loss is the difference between strikes minus credit received. Breakeven at $27.16, offering a favorable risk/reward with a defined loss.

Conclusion: To trade or not to trade?

Intel’s current situation presents both opportunities and challenges for options traders. The elevated implied volatility and takeover speculation create a unique environment, but also come with substantial risks. Whether you decide to trade Intel right now or not depends on your risk tolerance, market outlook, and trading strategy.

Use the information provided here to guide your decision-making, but remember to conduct your own due diligence before entering any position. No single strategy fits all traders, and the right choice will vary based on individual objectives and market conditions. So, to trade or not to trade? That’s a question only you can answer.

As always, stay vigilant and adjust positions as new information emerges. Happy trading!

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Ultimately, the strike is unlikely to negatively impact the U.S. economy unless it continues for a very extended period without intervention.

On October 1st, dockworkers on the East and Gulf Coasts of the U.S. went on strike. This marks the first strike on the East Coast since 1977. This labor action stems from a disagreement between the United States Maritime Alliance, representing U.S. ports, and the International Longshoremen's Association, a labor union, over stagnant wages and automation concerns. The strike affects 36 ports and roughly 45,000 longshoremen.

With the U.S. economy softer compared to a year ago and inflation near a comfortable level, investors worry the strike could impact the economic outlook. However, these concerns appear to be somewhat overstated.

Impacts on GDP should be limited, especially for durable goods. The strike will affect imports and exports of both durable and nondurable goods, with the level of impact fluctuating based on these variables. Nondurable goods, such as agricultural products, may spoil, leading to a complete loss from an export standpoint and potentially disrupting manufacturing processes if these goods are used as inputs. In contrast, durable goods for export might temporarily accumulate in inventories, altering GDP composition without significantly harming growth. According to Oxford Economics, the strike could reduce U.S. economic activity by $4.5 billion to $7.5 billion per week. Given the size of the U.S. economy, which is around $30 trillion, this would result in a minor reduction in quarterly growth.Inflation impacts should be modest and short-lived. Inflation is a concern because goods prices could increase temporarily due to scarcity or increased shipping costs. However, global shipping networks have proven to be resilient recently against weather disruptions and geopolitical conflicts. In fact, industry container data show a modest shift in trade to West Coast ports in anticipation of the strike, mitigating some of the impact. Moreover, according to estimates, 70% of U.S. retailers have built up inventories ahead of the upcoming holiday season, which removes a potential source of aggravation.

Historical examples, such as the 2002 and 2015 West Coast port strikes, show that although the shutdowns were short-lived, they had meaningful impacts on exports. However, their economic effects varied: in 2015, inventory building more than offset the decline in exports, resulting in higher growth during the affected quarter. In 2002, by contrast, inventories did not offset the decline in exports, and while growth was positive in the affected quarter, it was lower in the surrounding periods. Interestingly, President Bush ended the 2002 strike by invoking the Taft-Hartley Act, implementing an 80-day “cool down” period due to “national health and safety” reasons. While President Biden has not indicated plans to intervene, there are measures available if the situation worsens.

Ultimately, the strike is unlikely to negatively impact the U.S. economy unless it continues for a very extended period without intervention. Investors worried about interest rates should note that the Fed would likely see any impact from the strikes as isolated and not adjust its decisions due to its current focus on employment side risks. Therefore, key market dynamics, such as the rotation in U.S. equities and falling rates positively impacting short-to-intermediate duration fixed income, should remain intact.

Will U.S. Port Worker Strikes Negatively Impact the Economic Outlook?_1

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[Quick Facts]

1. Oil futures post their largest weekly gain in over a year.

2. Lebanon displacement crisis deepens amid escalating conflict.

3. Israel issues evacuation orders for most areas in north Gaza.

4. Dollar sees best week in 2 years; yen hits largest weekly drop since 2009.

5. U.S. non-farm payrolls are not as strong as they appear.

[News Details]

Oil futures post their largest weekly gain in over a year

Oil futures posted their largest gain in over a year last week, with even greater intensity in the options market. Hedge funds, commodity trading advisors, and other fund managers turned bearish on crude in mid-September, concerned that slowing growth in some regions would dampen demand. About two weeks ago, the volume of put options peaked.

"We have seen a sizeable bid in volatility and increased demand for upside exposure to oil prices," said Anurag Maheshwari, head of oil options at Optiver. "The escalation in the Middle East has sparked a massive amount of short covering in crude oil as CTAs have flipped from short to neutral," said Rebecca Babin, senior equity trader at CIBC Private Wealth Group.

Lebanon displacement crisis deepens amid escalating conflict

On October 6, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported that nearly 20,000 Palestinian refugees had been displaced as the Lebanon-Israel conflict continued to escalate. Dorothee Klaus, UNRWA's director in Lebanon, said UNRWA was hosting around 4,300 people in 12 shelters as of Thursday, October 3. "and this is a number that is now steadily going to increase," Klaus added. The UNRWA is preparing to open three more shelters if needed, Klaus said.

Israel issues evacuation orders for most areas in north Gaza

The New York Times reported on October 6 that the Israeli military issued evacuation orders for most areas in northern Gaza, stating that this move was in preparation for a "new phase" of the war. Israel announced on October 6 that the 162nd Division of the Israel Defense Forces launched a new ground operation in northern Gaza on the night of October 5. The troops of the 401st Brigade and the 460th Brigade encircled Jabalia overnight, and Israeli troops are now operating in the area.

Dollar sees best week in 2 years; yen hits largest weekly drop since 2009

The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index rose 1.6% last week, its best performance since September 2022. The yen took the hardest hit, falling 4.4% against the dollar, marking its biggest weekly drop since 2009. Aroop Chatterjee, a strategist at Wells Fargo & Co., said signs that the labor market is more resilient than expected should help temper expectations for aggressive rate cuts from the Federal Reserve. Swap traders now anticipate that the Fed will cut rates by about 50 basis points this year, down from more than 60 basis points forecast on Thursday.

U.S. non-farm payrolls are not as strong as they appear

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 254,000 in September, largely exceeding the expected 150,000 and the revised July figure of 159,000. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate stood at 4.1%, lower than the expected 4.2% and the previous 4.2%. Employment in the services sector expanded significantly, and persons who completed temporary jobs declined sharply. Additionally, new entrants and reentrants decreased, and the labor participation rate remained stable, reflecting moderate improvement in labor supply. Moreover, job vacancy and employment rates increased, while the gap between supply and demand narrowed at a slower pace. Quit and layoff rates declined, suggesting the job market is gradually cooling.

Although the number of non-farm payrolls spiked in September, the three-month average of 186,000 from July to September doesn't seem as impressive when considering the upward revisions to July and August data, which had averages of 140,000 and 159,000, respectively.

This indicates that the labor market is cooling, but not as drastically as initially thought. September's data may also be revised, just as the past few months' data has been. For example, July's initial figure of 114,000 was first revised to 89,000, and now to 144,000.

[Today's Focus]

UTC+8 15:45: ECB Chief Economist Lane Attends a Conference on Monetary Policy

UTC+8 19:45: ECB Governing Council Member Escriva Speaks

UTC+8 22:30: ECB Governing Council Member Nagel Speaks.

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Nuclear power offers several undeniable advantages over renewable energy, particularly regarding the scale and reliability of electricity generation. This resilience makes the need for backup generation unnecessary even when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing. Yet zero-emission nuclear power receives scant attention in the ongoing debate about the energy transition.

The European Union, the region most aggressively pursuing ambitious climate targets, hesitantly acknowledged nuclear energy in its 2022 “sustainable investment taxonomy.” This designation is intended for projects that will aid the transition from fossil fuels and ensure Europe achieves climate neutrality by 2050. The taxonomy ranks nuclear alongside natural gas – a hydrocarbon – describing both as “transitional activities” aimed at facilitating a shift away from more harmful energy sources like coal and toward a predominantly renewable future, although with “strict conditions” applying. Such a limited acknowledgment is unlikely to stimulate significant investment in nuclear power.

Despite the advent of nuclear energy nearly 70 years ago – when the first nuclear plant began operating in Obninsk, Russia – it currently accounts for the lowest share, a mere 4 percent, of the global primary energy mix, and represents only 9 percent of electricity generation. Even at its peak in 2001, nuclear energy represented less than 7 percent of the global energy framework. In contrast, the share of modern renewable energies surged from 1 to 8 percent between 2001 and 2023.

Nuclear power generation, which peaked at nearly 17.5 percent of the power sector’s global total in 1995, has followed a declining trend similar to that of oil. Conversely, natural gas and renewables like wind and solar have made substantial gains, rising from 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively, in 1995, to 23 percent and 31 percent, respectively, by 2023.

While a shift in energy sources is occurring, it appears the world is mainly replacing one fossil fuel with another and one green energy source for another. This is not indicative of a successful energy transition; on the contrary, the target outcome seeks to replace fossil fuels with truly sustainable and emissions-free energy options.

Nuclear trends

On a regional scale, trends diverge. While some corners of the globe have embraced nuclear power, others have abandoned it. Until 2016, Europe was the dominant player in the nuclear energy market, generating 36 percent of global nuclear power. Today, however, Europe ranks third, holding a 27 percent share, following North America at 34 percent and the Asia-Pacific region at 29 percent. In Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, nuclear energy usage is minimal, accounting for an aggregate share of just 2.5 percent.

But nuclear energy has recently witnessed a resurgence in support. In late 2023, for the first time at a Conference of Parties (COP, the highest-level decision-making body of the signatories of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), around 25 countries, including several European states, backed the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy capacity by 2050.

At the same time, the broader consensus takeaway from the meeting, known as the Global Stocktake, called for accelerated deployment of nuclear energy, prompting the International Atomic Energy Agency to describe these events as “nothing short of a historic milestone and a reflection of how much perspectives have changed.” Nevertheless, this renewed interest in nuclear energy remains dwarfed by the extensive financial support consistently enjoyed by renewable energy, which is regarded as the safer, more accessible alternative.

The debate surrounding nuclear energy is set to continue, with regional disparities persisting. Countries pursuing nuclear electricity generation will advance at markedly different rates, with several projects stalling in the planning phase. Overall, as the energy transition unfolds, nuclear power will likely remain a laggard despite its reliability and “green” potential.

Asia powering ahead

Asia-Pacific is currently leading the way in nuclear power development, accounting for 64 percent of all nuclear reactors under construction worldwide. China is at the forefront of this expansion, although nuclear power currently contributes less than 5 percent to its total electricity generation mix. Beijing aims to boost this figure to 10 percent by 2035 and 18 percent by 2060, which, if achieved, would significantly elevate global nuclear usage.

In terms of numbers, China generated around 435 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity from nuclear power in 2023, second only to the United States, where nuclear energy accounts for 817 TWh or 18 percent of the national power mix. France, the largest producer of nuclear power in Europe and the world’s largest net exporter of electricity, generates around 338 TWh each year through nuclear power, more than 65 percent of the country’s electricity mix – more than any other nation.

China currently boasts more nuclear reactors under construction than any other country and is on track to become the leading nuclear power producer by 2030. While the U.S. maintains the largest nuclear fleet, with 94 reactors, it took nearly 40 years for the country to add the same amount of nuclear power capacity that China achieved in just one decade.

South Korea, Asia-Pacific’s second largest consumer of nuclear power, produces 180 TWh annually – 29 percent of its energy mix – and since Yoon Suk Yeol moved into the president’s office in 2022, the country is now targeting a minimum nuclear share of 30 percent by 2030. That is a sharp reversal of the decision of Moon Jae-in, the former president elected in 2017 on a campaign to phase out nuclear energy.

The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, radically altered Japan’s energy landscape. By May 2012, all 54 of the country’s commercial nuclear reactors – responsible for generating about 30 percent of its electricity – had been shuttered. With few domestic energy resources to rely on, Japan was compelled to increase its dependence on fossil fuels imports, heightening its vulnerability in terms of energy security. More recently, the country has gradually reintroduced nuclear power, anticipating that it will contribute around 20 percent to its electricity generation mix by 2030, up from just 8 percent today.

India, too, is positioning itself as a significant nuclear-energy player in the region, aiming for a 70 percent increase in its nuclear power capacity by 2029, up from its share of 2 percent, or 48 TWh currently.

Wider interest in nuclear energy

Apart from Asia-Pacific, ambitious nuclear power targets are being set primarily in Europe. The United Kingdom, for instance, announced in January 2024 its largest nuclear expansion since its initial rollout, with plans to quadruple nuclear generation by 2050. The Czech Republic in July selected South Korea to deliver at least two new nuclear power units in the country, with an option for an additional four units. This will bolster the country’s existing nuclear fleet of six reactors that today generate about one-third of Czech electricity. Poland aims to begin construction of its first nuclear power plant in 2026.

France intends to construct at least six new reactors, partly to replace some of its ageing plants. In a notable shift, in 2023 the French government rescinded its objective from 2014 to reduce the share of nuclear energy to 50 percent by 2025. Such U-turns are uncommon with renewable energy.

In the Middle East, countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia are looking to join the United Arab Emirates and Iran as nuclear energy producers, primarily to free up more hydrocarbons for exports while addressing rapidly growing domestic energy demand.

Yet conversely, in North America, no new reactors are currently under construction. The U.S. government is focusing on extending the operational life of existing reactors, which typically receive a 40-year license that can be extended for two additional 20-year periods, for a total lifespan of 80 years.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) asserts that lifetime extension of existing nuclear power plants is highly competitive and remains the cheapest option for low-carbon generation compared to building entirely new power plants, either nuclear or conventional. Extending the use of nuclear plants is an indispensable and cost-effective strategy on the path to net zero by 2050, the agency argues.

Climbing construction costs

Nuclear power plants, once operational, are capable of providing a competitive, predictable and stable supply of electricity at scale without emissions. However, they require substantial upfront capital investment and have lengthy construction times, with a medial duration approaching eight years, compared to two and four years for gas- and coal-fired power plants, respectively.

The World Nuclear Association has pointed to economic risks stemming from competition with subsidized intermittent renewable energy. It says that government support for renewables is a major issue today, as the variability and intermittent nature of power generation from renewable energy forces other more stable generating sources, such as nuclear, natural gas or coal, to adjust their output at short notice, impacting profitability.

Moreover, nuclear projects typically face cost overruns and construction delays. Hinkley Point C, the United Kingdom’s first nuclear power plant in two decades, has been under construction since 2016. Its completion date has been pushed back several times, with the current estimate now set for 2029, leading to rising costs that far exceed those in initial projections that estimated completion “well before 2020.”

The highly specialized knowledge required for safe nuclear plant operation, decommissioning and disposal of waste contributes to rigorous regulation. The industry in fact is the most heavily regulated energy sector, which in turn can cause delays in construction and cost increases, limiting rapid expansion.

Despite stringent safety standards and oversight, the shadows of past disasters – most notably Three Mile Island in the U.S. in 1979, Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union in 1986 and Fukushima in Japan in 2011 – loom large, significantly shaping public perceptions of nuclear energy.

These disasters have had lingering impacts; after Chernobyl, Italians in a 1987 referendum voted overwhelmingly against further nuclear development, and the country gave up using domestically produced nuclear power. Similarly, on June 30, 2011, three months after the Fukushima disaster, Germany’s parliament voted to phase out nuclear energy altogether – an objective fully achieved in April 2023. Germany’s use of fossil fuels has increased as a result.

In December 2023, Spain followed suit, announcing plans to completely phase out its nuclear power by mid-2030, starting gradually in 2027, as it aims for a 100 percent renewable electricity system by 2050. Spain, along with Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark, strongly opposed the EU’s inclusion of nuclear power in its sustainable investment taxonomy.

Nuclear power politics

The IEA argues that advanced economies – where nuclear investments have stagnated and both budgets and timelines of the latest projects have frequently ballooned – have lost momentum and market leadership. Between 2017 and 2022, only four of the 31 new reactors then under construction were not of Russian or Chinese design.

At the forefront of the nuclear market is Russia, the world’s largest exporter of nuclear reactors and a leading supplier of enriched uranium. Its flagbearer is Rosatom, the State Atomic Energy Corporation, which maintains a dominant position globally with a reactor-construction order portfolio comprising 39 power units in 10 countries. Rosatom is also unique in possessing the full spectrum of technologies associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

In August 2024, China approved a record number (11) of permits for new nuclear reactors.

Between 2013-2023, nuclear was one of the slowest growing energy segments, with a growth rate of just 0.5% per annum during this period.

Since 2012, the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as the fastest-growing market for nuclear power, boasting an average growth rate of 8.5% from 2013-2023.

In 2022, the Asia-Pacific region surpassed Europe in nuclear energy production.

Although nuclear power is used in 32 countries, the market remains highly concentrated: The U.S., China and France account for 58% of global nuclear generation, and the top ten countries for 84%.

Two-thirds of the world’s uranium production comes from Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia.

However, the economic and political repercussions of the war in Ukraine pose a considerable threat to Russia’s continued preeminence in this sector, with broader implications for the expansion of nuclear power globally. While Rosatom itself is not subject to Western sanctions, some of its subsidiaries are. In May 2024, the Biden administration enacted a ban on imported Russian enriched uranium – although waivers can be issued under specific circumstances. Russia had been America’s top foreign source of the fuel, supplying about a quarter of the uranium used in U.S. reactors, and earning about $1 billion a year from those sales alone.

In Turkey, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant – the country’s first, developed in collaboration with Russia and with completion originally slated for 2028 – has announced delays. Rosatom’s director general, Alexey Likhachev, blamed the setbacks on “the Americans, who are going between our legal entities, between our banks.” Similarly, in Egypt, Rosatom’s $30 billion El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has encountered logistical problems, with its initial completion date of 2022 long since passed.

Source: GIS

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Fiscal Rules and Investment in the Upcoming Budget

What might it mean to recognise the benefits of investment?

Different debt and balance sheet measures

Target a slightly different measure of debt?

Target public sector net worth (PSNW)?

Target public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL)?

Conclusion

Gold Outlook: Solid Jobs Data Throws a Wrench into Fed's Plans

Gold outlook: what’s next for the Fed?

Looking ahead: key data to watch

Technical gold outlook: a bearish turn ahead?

Source: TradingView.com

The Crypto Market Awaits News

News background

What Are Your Options - Intel: to Trade or Not to Trade

Introduction

Important note:

Trading stocks with potential takeover news: What to watch out for

Implied volatility and options market opportunities

What the options chain says: Call/put skew

Options strategies for different scenarios

Conclusion: To trade or not to trade?

Will U.S. Port Worker Strikes Negatively Impact the Economic Outlook?

October 7th Financial News

[Quick Facts]

[News Details]

[Today's Focus]

Nuclear Energy: Not Much Reaction

Nuclear trends

Asia powering ahead

Wider interest in nuclear energy

Climbing construction costs

Nuclear power politics

Source: GIS

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